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DEPOLITICIZING THE SUPREME COURT THROUGH TERM LIMITS:
A WORTHWHILE REFORM EFFORT
Kara King*
The United States Supreme Court is in a legitimacy crisis.
Americans are losing faith in the Supreme Court as an independent
branch of government. As a result, policymakers and academics
have put forth several proposals to reform the Court. The concept
of an eighteen-year term limit maintains some bipartisan support
and stands out as the most likely reform. This Article argues that
term limits could help depoliticize the nomination process, bring
greater stability to the Court, and restore confidence in the Court.
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INTRODUCTION
In his confirmation hearing in 2005, Chief Justice John
Roberts stated that the job of a U.S. Supreme Court Justice is to “call
balls and strikes, [] not to pitch or bat.”1 In this metaphor—that a
judge is like a baseball umpire who simply calls balls and strikes—
Chief Justice Roberts was alluding to the principle that the Framers
———————————————————————————
* Law Clerk at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP; J.D. 2022; Fordham
University School of Law. I would like to thank the Voting Rights and Democracy
Forum’s staff for their excellent guidance and my family for their constant
support.
1
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (Statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to
be Chief Justice of the United States) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t
make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.
They make sure everybody plays by the rules . . . .”).
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intended the judiciary to be the apolitical branch of government that
follows the rule of law. 2 As Supreme Court confirmation battles
have grown increasingly contentious and partisan,3 however, so too
has the public’s dissatisfaction with the Court. For example, in
2000, approximately 62 percent of Americans approved the Court’s
performance.4 Today, that approval has dropped to 40 percent.5
The growing chorus of reform proposals calling for
significant change in the Court highlights this notable decrease in
approval of—and as a result, confidence in—the Court itself.6
Several candidates for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination
ran on platforms explicitly encouraging such reform—including
expanding the Court, imposing term limits, and implementing age
limits on Justices.7 Indeed, once elected, President Joseph R. Biden
appointed a bipartisan commission, the Presidential Commission on
———————————————————————————
2

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (“The [Judiciary], by the mode of
their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far
removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions.”). See also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The complete independence of the
courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. . . . Limitations .
. . can be preserved in . . . [the] courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.”).
3
The Senate’s role in failing to consider President Barack Obama’s nomination
of Merrick Garland and its hurried confirmation of now-Justice Amy Coney
Barrett has only exacerbated the public’s discontent with the confirmation
process. See Carl Hulse, Cloud of Supreme Court Confirmation Bitterness Hangs
Over Coming Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022
/01/29/us/politics/supreme-court-confirmation-battles.html [https://perma.cc
/4P5P-MRBA]. See also Drew DeSilver, Up Until the Postwar Era, U.S. Supreme
Court Confirmations Usually Were Routine Business, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 7,
2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/02/07/up-until-the-postwarera-u-s-supreme-court-confirmations-usually-were-routine-business [https://
perma.cc/EN28-YFJS0].
4
Jeffrey M. Jones, Supreme Court Trust, Job Approval at Historical Lows,
GALLUP (Sept. 29, 2022), https://news.gallup.com/poll/402044/supreme-courttrust-job-approval-historical-lows.aspx [https://perma.cc/G3GT-26QD].
5
Id.
6
See generally Jonathan Chart, Democrats Must Reform the Supreme Court to
Save It, N.Y. MAG. (June 30, 2022), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article
/democrats-reform-the-supreme-court-pack-roe-epa.html [https://perma.cc
/4W4Y-688P]; Mary Harris, How the President Could Counter a Rogue Supreme
Court, SLATE (July 6, 2022, 1:44 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022
/07/supreme-court-biden-pack-reform-conservatives-commission.html [https://
perma.cc/DWP9-7ZL3]; Ben Olinsky & Grace Oyenubi, How Americans Can
Fight Back Against a Radical Supreme Court Majority, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(June 30, 2022), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-americans-can
-fight-back-against-a-radical-supreme-court-majority
[https://perma.cc/D5S33PWT].
7
See Russell Wheeler, Should We Restructure the Supreme Court?, BROOKINGS
INST. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/shouldwe-restructure-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/TDR4-JLUQ].
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the Supreme Court of the United States, to evaluate these and other
proposals.8
Despite a variety of reform proposals, the implementation of
term limits for Justices is the only recommendation supported by
both Republicans and Democrats on the Commission.9 In recent
years, influential Republican lawmakers—including Senators Ted
Cruz and Marco Rubio—have expressed openness to term limits.10
By contrast, other proposals—such as Court expansion—have
generated vehement disagreement across party lines.11 Thus, the
bipartisan interest in implementing term limits is more likely than
other reform proposals to be enacted.12 Indeed, term limits could be
a potential solution to the growing discontent with the Court’s
perceived politicization in recent years.
How did the Highest Court in our country come to be so
politicized, and what are effective measures to combat this growing
tension? Part I begins to answer these questions by providing a brief
background of “life tenure” under the U.S. Constitution. It then
examines the rise of the Court’s polarization and the growing calls
for reform. Next, Part II analyzes arguments for and against term
limits for Justices. Lastly, Part III proposes that term limits would
help alleviate several issues facing the Court and should receive
serious consideration by Congress and the Biden Administration.
I. POLARIZATION IN THE COURT AND REFORM EFFORTS
First, Part I.A explains the current system of “life tenure” for
Justices. After providing a brief background, Part I.B examines the
polarization affecting the Court today.
———————————————————————————
8

Andrew Chung & Steve Holland, Biden Forms Panel to Study Possible U.S.
Supreme Court Expansion, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.reuters.com
/business/legal/biden-creates-commission-study-potential-supreme-courtexpansion-2021-04-09 [https://perma.cc/WBP6-TCJ3].
9
See Ann E. Marimow, Biden’s Supreme Court Commission Endorses Final
Report Noting Bipartisan Public Support for Term Limits, WASH. POST (Dec. 7,
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court
-commission-term-limits/2021/12/07/eb0ef982-5767-11ec-9a18-a506cf3aa31d
_story.html [https://perma.cc/R3VE-BYQS].
10
See Conservative Thinkers Renew Their Support for SCOTUS Term Limits, FIX
THE COURT (Dec. 5, 2019), https://fixthecourt.com/2019/12/conservativethinkers-endorse-scotus-term-limits [https://perma.cc/RZR2-2WYW].
11
See Charlie Savage, Biden’s Supreme Court Commission Shows Interest in
Term Limits for Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
/2021/11/18/us/politics/supreme-court-term-limits-biden.html [https://perma.cc
/25LB-AZNE].
12
See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: FINAL REPORT (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/12/SCOTUS-Report-Final-12.8.21-1.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION
FINAL REPORT].
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A. “Life Tenure” and the Constitution
Since the Founding, Justices have had life tenure on the
Under current practice, Justices typically remain on the
Court for life unless they choose to retire. 14 While the Constitution
never explicitly uses the phrase “life tenure,” Article III provides
that “Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour.”15 Although the Constitution
does not define “good Behaviour,” this provision is understood to
confer life tenure to federal judges.16 Of course, federal judges,
including Justices, may be removed through impeachment.17
This reading of the Good Behavior Clause, however, is not
beyond debate.18 Indeed, scholars across the ideological spectrum
have proposed term limits for Justices, defining the outer boundary
of judicial service by time rather than behavior.19 These proposals,
as discussed in greater detail in Parts II and III, are increasingly
timely given the heightened polarization surrounding the Court.
Court.13

B. The Perceived Polarization Today
Despite efforts by Court institutionalists, the growing
polarization of American politics has seeped into the fabric of the
judiciary. In Bush v. Gore,20 for example, the Court essentially
decided the outcome of the 2000 presidential election.21 Dissenting
Justice John Paul Stevens noted that the case created a loss in “the
———————————————————————————
13

See id. at 112.
KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV. R46731, PROPOSALS TO MODIFY
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES’ TENURE: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2021).
15
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
16
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Good Behavior Clause to mean that
federal judges enjoy life tenure unless impeached. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (explaining that Article III judges are
appointed for life and subject to removal only via impeachment); United States v.
Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (explaining that Article III, Section 1 grants federal
judges “the practical equivalent of life tenure . . . .”).
17
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (granting Congress authority to impeach and remove
federal “civil officers” for treason, bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”).
18
See Adam Chilton et al., Designing Supreme Court Term Limits, 95 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2021).
19
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Introduction to Reforming
the Court: A Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT at 5-7 (Roger
C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (noting the ideological variety of
legal scholars in favor of term limits for Justices).
20
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
21
On a seven-to-two split, the Court found that the Florida recount process
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 108-10. On a five-to-four split,
however, five Justices held that the matter not be remanded for remedial action
by the state of Florida—thus ending the election in favor of George W. Bush. Id.
at 110-11.
14
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Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule
of law.”22 While the decision was bitterly criticized as steeped in
partisanship,23 the public dissatisfaction today appears even
deeper.24
Indeed, perceived politicization of the Court has become
increasingly more pronounced as the new six-Justice majority has
overturned longstanding precedents concerning abortion,25 gun
safety laws,26 administrative regulatory power,27 and religious
issues.28 For instance, the Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade
in June 2022 sparked public outcry with the Court, including
nationwide protests and calls for major Court reform.29
Moreover, the Court’s recent use of its “shadow docket”30—
a practice allowing Justices to grant or deny emergency relief to
litigants from lower court rulings—has increased dramatically.31
From August 2021 to July 2022, for example, the Court issued more
docket orders than opinions.32 These shadow docket cases have
———————————————————————————
22

Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See generally Mark S. Brodin, Bush v. Gore: The Worst (Or At Least Secondto-the-Worst) Supreme Court Decision Ever, 12 NEV. L. J. 563 (2012).
24
See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text; Savage, supra note 11.
25
See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
26
See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc., et al. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
27
See West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
28
See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407 (2022).
29
See Holly Honderich, Roe v. Wade: Thousands March to White House for
Abortion Rights, BBC (July 3, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-62109971 [https://perma.cc/V98F-C5RW]. Indeed, the decision also
generated apprehension from several powerful conservative voices. See Mike
DeBonis & Seung Min Kim, Collins and Murkowski on the Defensive After
Leaked Roe Draft Opinion, WASH. POST (May 3, 2022, 6:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/03/murkowski-collins-roeabortion-opinion [https://perma.cc/4ZG2-AH3Y].
30
The term “shadow docket” was coined by law Professor William Baude and
refers to the thousands of cases that the Court decides without full briefing and
oral argument. See Samantha O’Connell, Supreme Court Shadow Docket Under
Review by U.S. House of Representatives, A.B.A. (Apr. 14, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/
publications/project_blog/scotus-shadow-docket-under-review-by-house-reps
[https://perma.cc/DC38-TSJ8]. These decisions typically “lack such public
deliberation and transparency” as they often do not contain how each justice voted
and the reasoning behind the majority’s conclusion. Id.
31
See, e.g., Texas’s Unconstitutional Abortion Ban and the Role of the Shadow
Docket: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 4 (2021)
(statement of Stephen I. Vladeck, Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts,
University of Texas School of Law).
32
See Kimberley Strawbridge Robinson, Supreme Court Conservatives Want
More Robust ‘Shadow Docket’ (1), BL (July 8, 2022, 12:51 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/supreme-courts-conservativeswant-more-robust-shadow-docket [https://perma.cc/Q5PA-84PZ] (finding that
the Court issued 66 shadow docket orders and 60 opinions).
23
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limited briefings and no oral arguments.33 Such decisions are often
issued without any written opinions. 34 And if a shadow docket
ruling does produce an opinion, it is often unsigned and without any
legal reasoning.35
In a recent shadow docket dissent, Justice Elena Kagan
stated that the Court’s shadow docket decision-making has
“become[] more unreasoned, inconsistent and impossible to
defend.”36 Despite its lack of transparency, the shadow docket is
also used in highly politicized cases. Indeed, while executionrelated appeals are a common example of shadow docket cases, the
Court’s recent trend includes more unconventional topics—such as
abortion, voting, and COVID-19 rules.37 For example, in December
2021, the Court issued a shadow docket ruling that allowed the neartotal abortion ban in Texas to stand. 38 Some legal experts contend
that the shadow docket is too often used to temporarily circumvent
full briefings—allowing Justices to avoid attaching their names to
unpopular decisions.39 With the Court’s increased use of its shadow
docket—and the controversial cases that continuously reach the
Court—accusations of politicization in the judiciary have reached a
boiling point.40
To combat this politicization, some prominent politicians
and scholars have called for reforms to the structure of the Court.
During the 2020 presidential campaign, for example, Democratic
presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg made headlines after
suggesting that Democrats should expand the Court to fifteen
seats.41 In addition, some scholars have proposed a framework
allowing presidents the opportunity to choose two Justices during
their four-year term to ensure that one political party does not have
———————————————————————————
See O’Connell, supra note 30.
See id.
35
See id. See also David Leonhardt, Rulings Without Explanations, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/03/briefing/scotus-shadowdocket-texas-abortion-law.html [https://perma.cc/7P2E-YGTT].
36
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2500 (2021) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting from the denial to vacate stays).
37
See Robinson, supra note 32.
38
See Whole Woman’s Health, 141 S. Ct. at 2494 (2021).
39
See, e.g., Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Opinion, Is the Supreme Court Facing a
Legitimacy Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022
/06/29/opinion/supreme-court-legitimacy-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/SV33NXPZ].
40
See id.
41
See Ian Millhiser, Pete Buttigieg Longs for a Non-Political Supreme Court.
That’s Not Really Possible, VOX (Oct. 30, 2019, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com
/2019/10/30/20930662/pete-buttigieg-court-packing-anthony-kennedy-citizensunited [https://perma.cc/D4DE-8RH6] (explaining that Buttigieg’s plan would
include Justices choosing whom to appoint to five of the seats on the Court).
33
34
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an outsized influence on the Court. 42 Other scholars have floated
the idea of a bipartisan selection process for Justices, or a rotating
Court where federal appellate court judges would serve for certain
periods before returning to their lower court positions.43
Nonetheless, several of these proposals have significant
constitutional limitations and do not enjoy the kind of bipartisan
support that the term limits proposal does.44
II. THE DEBATE OVER AN EIGHTEEN-YEAR TERM LIMIT FOR
JUSTICES
The proposal of an eighteen-year term limit stands out as the
one idea that has gained bipartisan traction.45 There are two possible
ways to implement term limits: an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution or a congressional statute. Some legal scholars argue
that a Justice’s “life tenure” can only be ended by a constitutional
amendment—an avenue that requires approval from two-thirds of
both congressional chambers and three-fourths of states.46 Other
scholars disagree, however, and believe that a statutory solution is
within Congress’s power.47
Section A briefly discusses the bipartisan support behind the
two paths to implement term limits. Section B then discusses the
arguments in favor of term limits—such as discouraging Justices
from spending decades on the Court and allowing presidents to
choose less ideologically extreme jurists. Finally, Section C
analyzes the arguments against term limits—such as the potential
constitutional issues raised and an increased instability in the rule of
law.
A. Bipartisan Support to Implement Term Limits
The proposal to implement term limits on Justices finds
support on both sides of the political aisle. Former Texas Governor
———————————————————————————
42

See Aaron Blake, 4 Ideas for Supreme Court Reform, WASH. POST (Apr. 15,
2021, 11:59 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/15/4-ideassupreme-court-reform [https://perma.cc/5JMR-V6TN].
43
Id.
44
For example, Pete Buttigieg’s plan to have sitting Justices select new Justices
would likely be declared unconstitutional. See Millhiser, supra note 41. The
Constitution is clear: Presidents must name federal judges and the Senate must
confirm them. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. And a system of rotating judges would
likely go against Article III, which says that judges should be able to keep their
positions so long as they continue to have good behavior. Id. art. III., § 1.
45
See Ian Millhiser, 9 Ways to Reform the Supreme Court Besides Court-Packing,
VOX (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.vox.com/21514454/supreme-court-amyconey-barrett-packing-voting-rights [https://perma.cc/4XLT-QVRC].
46
See COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 130.
47
See id.
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Rick Perry, for example, included term limits in his 2012
Republican presidential campaign platform.48 Republican Senator
Marco Rubio has also stated his support for this proposed reform,
specifically through a constitutional amendment.49 Additionally,
some House Democrats introduced legislation in 2020 and 2022
imposing eighteen-year term limits on Justices.50 Term limits also
appear to be broadly popular with the public—indeed, a recent poll
found that 72 percent of Americans support term limits for
Justices.51 Accordingly, term limits are worthy of serious
conversation, although a significant push for implementation does
not appear to be on the immediate horizon.
In response to the vacancy left by the late Justice Ginsburg,
a group of House Democrats introduced a plan to implement term
limits.52 Specifically, the plan would allow Justices to serve on the
Supreme Court for eighteen years. 53 At the end of their term, the
Justices could retire or continue serving on a federal appellate
court.54 The plan would also allow the president to nominate a
Justice during the “first and third years” of their presidency.55 The
Senate would then have “120 days” to act upon that nomination. 56
Other proposals address the common critique that this plan
would allow the Court’s bench to exceed nine Justices. For
example, one proposal suggests that the Court’s longest-serving
member should automatically move to a “senior” position of
———————————————————————————
48

See Todd Gillman, Perry Has Plenty of Ideas on Supreme Court, Including
Term Limits, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 31, 2011), https://archive.sltrib.com/article
.php?id=52493936&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc/F764-CCUT].
49
See What Senators Have Said About Term Limits, FIX THE COURTS (Aug. 2,
2022), https://fixthecourt.com/2021/05/senatorsonscotustermlimits [https://
perma.cc/B3EG-XHXA].
50
See Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointment Act of 2020, H.R.
8424, 116th Cong. (2020). See generally Veronica Stracqualursi, House
Democrats to Introduce Bill Setting 18-Year Term Limit for Supreme Court
Justices, CNN (Sept. 25, 2020), https://us.cnn.com/2020/09/25/politics/housedemocrats-bill-supreme-court-term-limits/index.html [https://perma.cc/8BTCA5L3]. Notably, congressional Democrats released similar legislation in July
2022. See Supreme Court Tenure Establishment and Retirement Modernization
Act of 2022, H.R. 8500, 117th Cong. (2022).
51
Seung Min Kim & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Term Limits Are Popular –
and Appear to be Going Nowhere, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/12/28/supreme-court-term-limits
[https://perma.cc/K6LZ-PD9N].
52
See H.R. 8424.
53
Id. § 4.
54
Id.
55
Id. § 2.
56
Id. If the Senate does not act, however, the bill deems the Senate as having
“waived its advice and consent authority with respect to such nominee, and the
nominee shall be seated as a Justice of the Supreme Court.” Id.
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status.57 Under this designation, the “senior” Justice would be
limited to voting on cases the Court decides to hear, and serving in
place of a recused Justice—but would otherwise not serve on the
Court.58 Another suggestion would keep the biennial nomination
schedule as proposed, but prohibit new Justices from hearing cases
until a vacancy actually opens on the Court.59
Generally, scholars believe having a Court with ten or eleven
Justices for a short period would produce more stability while term
limits are implemented.60 In any event, while some proposals
recommend implementing term limits through a constitutional
amendment, others suggest implementing the change by statute—as
in the House Democrats’ plan.61
B. Arguments in Favor of Term Limits
Proponents contend that term limits are logically justifiable
and may fix many current issues plaguing the Court. First,
advocates argue that this reform would prevent Justices from staying
on the Court for decades—perhaps past their intellectual prime or
health capacity.62 Proponents contend that term limits would be
consistent with the Founders’ expectations given the relatively short
life span of Justices at the time the Constitution was adopted.63
Presently, with progress in modern medicine, the average retirement
age of Justices is eighty-one years old.64 And the current length on
the bench is twenty-eight years.65
———————————————————————————
57

Linda Myers, Law Professor Proposes Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices,
CORNELL CHRON. (Jan. 27, 2005), https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2005/01/lawprofessor-proposes-term-limits-supreme-court-justices [https://perma.cc/QZ4JKUHX].
58
Id.
59
See Tyler Cooper, Supreme Court Term Limits–Here’s the Best Option, BL
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/supreme-courtterm-limits-heres-the-best-option [https://perma.cc/WWH9-32UQ].
60
See id. See also Term Limits, FIX THE COURTS, https://fixthecourt.com/fix/term
-limits [https://perma.cc/5MXT-A6BP] (last visited Oct. 20, 2022); Maggie Jo
Buchanan, The Need for Supreme Court Term Limits, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/need-supreme-courtterm-limits [https://perma.cc/6AEA-LU7F].
61
See, e.g., Adam Chilton et al., Biden’s Commission Is Examining Supreme
Court Term Limits. Those Could Have Unintended Consequences, WASH. POST
(Apr. 1, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/01
/bidens-commission-is-examining-supreme-court-term-limits-those-could-haveunintended-consequences [https://perma.cc/8PFE-X7AS].
62
See Phillip D. Oliver, Assessing and Addressing the Problems Caused by Life
Tenure, 13 J. OF APP. PRAC. AND PROCESS 11, 20-21 (2012).
63
See Term Limits, supra note 60.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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Notably, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg died while sitting on
the Court at the ages of seventy-nine and eighty-seven,
respectively.66 Justice Scalia was privately suffering from several
health issues, including coronary artery disease, diabetes, and
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 67 Justice Ginsburg passed
away from metastatic pancreatic cancer, and had gone through
multiple hospitalizations for her illnesses in the few years preceding
her death.68 Despite these serious ailments, both stayed on the Court
until their deaths.69 Proponents of term limits argue that this reform
would make vacancies less sporadic and allow Justices to retire
when appropriate.70
Advocates also suggest that both parties concentrate too
much on finding young nominees, rather than simply finding those
who are the most qualified.71 The last four nominees to the Court
have been forty-nine, fifty-three, forty-eight, and fifty-one,
respectively.72 At the same time, the average age of the federal
judiciary is sixty-nine.73 The recent prevalence of younger jurists is
even more profound in the lower federal courts.74 President
———————————————————————————
66

See Robert Barnes & Michael A. Fletcher, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme
Court Justice and Legal Pioneer for Gender Equality, Dies at 87, WASH. POST
(Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/ruth-baderginsburg-dies/2020/09/18/3cedc314-fa08-11ea-a275-1a2c2d36e1f1_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7C6X-X5X3].
67
Andrew Cohen, Americans Knew Little About Scalia’s Health Problems. That
Should Change, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 26, 2016),
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Trump’s nominees for judicial vacancies were, on average, fortyseven years old, and in total, only five of his judicial nominees were
older than fifty-five.75 Similarly, during the first two years of
President Biden’s term, his judicial nominees were forty-eight years
old, on average.76 Accordingly, proponents of term limits argue that
shortening tenure to eighteen years would eliminate the incentive to
view age as a primary qualifier and subsequently allow presidents
to focus on actual judicial qualifications.77
Proponents suggest that shorter terms may reduce the focus
of a judge’s political leanings, as each Justice would have less of an
impact on the Court’s ideological leanings.78 Likewise, they
contend term limits would disincentivize Justices from staying on
the Court until a president of their own political party is in office.79
Indeed, because lifetime tenure can last decades, presidents tend to
search for nominees with similar ideological views.80 For example,
President Trump’s judicial appointments tended to be more vocally
conservative—in both their academic writings and judicial
opinions.81 Indeed, all of President Trump’s Supreme Court
appointees were members of the conservative legal group, the
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Federalist Society. 82 In response, however, Democrats too have
organized around judicial nominations. 83
Finally, advocates argue that term limits may help bring
fresh perspectives to the Court.84 Some legal scholars suggest that
Justices become “more distant” from the implications of their
decisions on the public the longer they sit on the Court.85 In 1983,
Chief Justice Roberts, then a Harvard Law student, wrote that term
limits would “ensure that federal judges would not lose all touch
with reality after decades of ivory tower experience.” 86 Indeed,
advocates contend that regular changes in the Court’s composition
“can be especially important for bodies where a small number of
people hold considerable power.” 87 By compelling more turnover,
advocates for term limits reason that the Court will be more
representative of the American public’s current viewpoints.
C. Arguments Against Term Limits
Although term limits are broadly popular among the
American public, some scholars and politicians have highlighted
drawbacks associated with imposing term limits on Justices.88 For
example, opponents contend that lifetime tenure creates an essential
pillar of judicial independence.89 If Justices did not have lifetime
tenure, the argument goes, they may attempt to gain the favor of
certain litigants to receive access to coveted job opportunities after
their tenure expired.90
Opponents also argue that the increased turnover of Justices
could lead to doctrinal instability. 91 As it stands, the ideological
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makeup of the Court tends to change slowly over time.92 Eighteenyear terms, however, could lead to a more rapidly changing judicial
philosophy.93 Statistical modeling has shown that a rapidly
changing Court could reverse itself multiple times over relatively
short periods.94 Thus, opponents contend that this inconsistency
could delegitimize the judiciary in the eyes of both legal scholars
and the American public—and even weaken the rule of law.95
There are also concerns that term limits would do little to
decrease the partisan nature of Court appointments.96 For example,
under the eighteen-year term limit proposal, a political party that
controlled the Senate—with the opposite party in control of the
White House—could hold up a nomination for four years.97 If a
president was subsequently elected from the same political party in
control of the Senate, that president would be able to pick four
Justices (the two previously blocked plus the two in the president’s
term).98
Term limits could also make Supreme Court nominations an
even more salient issue in presidential campaigns.99 Given that the
current polarized climate is unlikely to subside in the near future,
presidential nominees could run on platforms promising to nominate
specific ideologues to the Court.100 In fact, confirmation hearings
in the Senate, already used for partisan showmanship, may devolve
into even worse contentious hearings, causing further damage to the
Court’s integrity.101
Finally, many scholars believe that lifetime tenure is
enshrined in the Constitution.102 Some scholars interpret the Good
Behavior Clause to mean that lifetime tenure is a protected right
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guaranteed by the Constitution. 103 This interpretation is further
supported by Federalist Paper No. 78, in which Alexander Hamilton
wrote that “nothing can contribute so much to [the judiciary’s]
firmness and independence as permanency in office . . . . ”104
If term limits were enacted by statute—as in the House
Democrats’ plan—there would likely be subsequent constitutional
challenges.105 Thus, given the arduous process of amending the
Constitution,106 this particular reform is perhaps not even viable.
III. TERM LIMITS SHOULD BE ENACTED
The Court is an essential part of America’s functioning
democracy. Imposing term limits has the potential to help the Court
improve its legitimacy in the public’s eyes. After the death of the
late Justice Ginsburg in 2020, the Court moved to a six-to-three
Republican-appointed majority. Although Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kavanaugh have occasionally sided with the
Democratic-appointed Justices, both ultimately joined the
conservative majority in overturning Roe v. Wade.107 Indeed, this
decision, along with several other major political cases decided by
the conservative majority in the 2021-22 Term,108 indicates a
conservative belief that the Court should revisit past decisions. 109 If
significant legal rights continue to be decided by six-to-three or fiveto-four “party line” votes, Americans will undoubtedly lose even
more confidence in the Court.110 Of course, calls for structural
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change like implementing term limits will depend on several factors
such as public reaction and how much power the Democrats hold in
Congress and in the White House.
With term limits, however, Americans who disagree with the
Court’s philosophies would be more hopeful that turnover would
eventually balance out the Court’s decisions. 111 Furthermore, term
limits could also reduce some of the “luck” associated with the
judicial selection process. For example, President Trump appointed
three Justices in his four-year term—compared to Presidents Clinton
and Obama, who each appointed two Justices over eight years.112
As such, term limits would allow the Court to become a more
representative body, as each president would have an equal chance
to nominate candidates to the Court.
Support for term limits is also bolstered by the fact that our
judiciary is one of the only systems in the world that does not require
term limits or a mandatory retirement age.113 Moreover, even within
the United States, the practice of lifetime tenure is unique: all of the
highest courts in every U.S. state—except for Rhode Island—
require term limits or mandatory retirement. 114 Although some
opponents of term limits argue that lifetime tenure is an essential
bulwark against judicial corruption, the vast majority of judicial
systems do not allow lifetime tenure—yet their governments
continue to function.115 Abolishing lifetime tenure is not likely to
lead to the type of corruption opponents fear and would align the
United States with most judicial systems. 116
Additionally, term limits are unlikely to create the type of
doctrinal inconsistency opponents fear. An eighteen-year term limit
is still a significant amount of time on the Court. And each
president, on average, would have the opportunity to appoint two———————————————————————————
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to-four Justices.117 A slight increase in Justice turnover is unlikely
to cause a serious threat to the rule of law.118 Moreover, the legal
principle of stare decisis dictates that Justices follow the Court's
prior rulings irrespective of the length of their term.119 Although the
Court does not always follow this principle, it has, for the most part,
stopped Justices from ruling against longstanding precedent in the
past.120 Thus, there appears to be little risk that a limited term would
lead a Justice to ignore precedent.121
Lastly, the concern that term limits may not be imposed by
statute is also misplaced. The proposal can be fashioned to allow
Justices to continue to serve on a lower court after their eighteenyear term has expired.122 After all, the constitutional provision
allowing Justices to serve as long as they exhibit “good [b]ehaviour”
does not prevent them from serving on another, lower court.123 In
fact, many legal scholars have long considered Justices assuming a
“senior” status position constitutional under Article III.124 Thus, the
language of Article III does not prohibit this reform.
CONCLUSION
Although term limits may likely be politically challenging to
enact, political leaders should consider this proposal as a tool to
combat the increasing polarization concerning the Court. There is a
serious appetite for change: 67 percent of Americans favor term
limits—including 57 percent of Republicans and 82 percent of
Democrats.125 Ultimately, term limits could help depoliticize the
nomination process, bring greater stability to the Court, and restore
confidence in the Court.
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